Letter and Spirit by Gallo, Ernest
Masthead Logo The Iowa Review
Volume 9
Issue 4 Fall Article 5
1978
Letter and Spirit
Ernest Gallo
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.uiowa.edu/iowareview
Part of the Creative Writing Commons
This Contents is brought to you for free and open access by Iowa Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Iowa Review by an
authorized administrator of Iowa Research Online. For more information, please contact lib-ir@uiowa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gallo, Ernest. "Letter and Spirit." The Iowa Review 9.4 (1978): 10-15. Web.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17077/0021-065X.2375
Letter and Spirit Ernest Gallo 
WHEN WE ARE confronted with a text we are also confronted with this 
question: In what sense should we take this text? From our experience, it 
seems impossible for a text both to assert itself and to explain itself beyond 
all possibility of misunderstanding. A text can make a statement, but 
experience shows us that readers will understand that statement in many 
different ways. What the text cannot do is to verify which of those ways is 
most in accord with its own meaning. 
Take the following text as an example: 
We have to learn to think in antinomies, constantly bearing in mind that 
every truth turns into an antinomy if it is thought out to the end. 
C. G.Jung 
Jung's statement will irritate some: for is it really true that if we carefully 
examine the statement "These words form a proposition" it will finally 
turn out to mean that "These words do not form a proposition"? But others 
will find Jung's statement to be transparently true: "Do not be so literal. 
Consider not the gross literal accuracy, but the spirit of the statement. Jung 
is concerned with the fact that any judgment which is not merely literal 
tends to imply its own opposite." 
Now, if this last observation is the case, our problem has grown: for in 
stead of 
merely observing that it is difficult to discern the sense of a text, we 
must now admit that any text, if it is "thought out to the end," will produce 
two 
meanings?at least two meanings?which are exactly the opposite of 
one another. And that can be distressing. 
The spirit; the letter. Surely the answer lies in the space between the two. 
As everyone knows, 
The letter killeth, while the spirit giveth life. 
Jung would have us believe that if the letter is examined closely enough, it 
becomes spirit; and if spirit is examined closely enough, it becomes letter. 
We could then frame a new dictum, 
The spirit killeth, while the letter giveth life. 
?which is perhaps something that not everyone knows. 
The spirit is the true meaning, the original insight, that underlies the 
letter, the literal statement. The spirit gives rise to the letter which, how 
ever, never quite expresses the spirit. 
Now, if words were always effective expressions of numinous powers, 
nomina sunt numina, there would be no gap between spirit and letter. Plato 
was suspicious of the written word, for it lies on the page without the living 
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presence of a teacher to give that word its intended meaning: "When words 
have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among 
those who may or may not understand them . . . and if they are maltreated 
or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or 
defend themselves. ..." The written word is only a dead image of the 
spoken word, of "an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, 
which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent." 
The word, written on the page by teacher or his disciple, loses some of its 
life: it has less spirit, and the dead weight of the letter grows heavier. The 
extreme case would be one wherein there was no spirit, no intended, living 
meaning at all?for example, in an utterance written on the page by a 
machine. 
Such machines have been proposed, in earnest by Raymond Lully, in jest 
by Jonathan Swift. In his Ars magna (1305-8), Lully perfected an art of 
combination in which certain concepts, represented by letters of the alpha 
bet arrayed in three concentric circles, could be brought into differing rela 
tions with one another by the simple means of rotating the circles and so 
changing the combination of concepts. Lully, who drew upon Scotus and 
the Cabala, was deadly serious about this art, to which he devoted a large 
part of his life. Swift's philosophical machine is less serious?is, in fact, a 
satire on philosophers who, Swift implies, seem to throw together their 
discourse from a series of words taken at random. In Swift's machine, 
words are written on the faces of cubes which are then rotated, and the re 
sulting string of words is then transcribed into a book. Most of the 
sentences thus formed are nonsense, but a few reveal divinest sense?at 
least, to the eye of the philosopher. 
This is not altogether foolery. It has been observed that the most pro 
found aphorisms are difficult to distinguish from the most trivial. If Swift's 
machine were to produce the sentence God is love, would that sentence be 
profound or trivial? What if these same words had been uttered by Oral 
Roberts? Schweitzer? Peale? Are the following words profound or bathetic: 
One word can redeem us from the myriad sorrows 
of the world: 
That word is love. 
When we learn that these words were written by Sophocles, are we ready to 
murmur "How profound"? How are we to understand these words? Plac 
ing them in their context sounds promising until we remember the context 
of the word love in Oedipus at Colonus: that context includes Oedipus' love 
for his mother, now transferred to his daughter. Does that context clarify or 
obscure the import of the quoted lines? If these lines had been written by a 
machine rather than by Sophocles, would they be easier to understand, or 
to dismiss? 
11 
Hypothetically, one could print a whole library of great books, as well as 
of nonsense books, simply by programming a printing press to print letters 
in every possible permutation and combination. In "The Universal Li 
brary" (1901), Kurd Lasswitz describes an automatic printing machine set 
to produce books with forty lines to the page and fifty characters to the line 
(the blank space which separates words counts as one character). No human 
agent is needed: the machine determines the order of the characters purely 
by chance. The library will contain masterpieces?some as yet unwritten? 
side by side with utter nonsense: 
If an author has written the most incredible nonsense it will, of course, be 
in the Universal Library. It will be under his by-line. But it will also be 
under the by-line of William Shakespeare and under any other possible 
by-line. He will find one of his books where it is asserted after every 
sentence that all this is nonsense and another one where it is stated after 
the self-same sentences that they are the purest wisdom. 
Lasswitz suggests that his own essay will be found in the Universal Library, 
probably in the nonsense section. But who can tell whether a particular 
volume should be classed with nonsense books or with books of the purest 
wisdom? Only a true catalogue can be relied on to make such judgments 
and accurately assign such values. It may seem difficult to catalogue a li 
brary of 1020,000,000 volumes: but remembers that among the volumes would 
be a true catalogue of the library. 
The only difficulty would be to find it. 
Jorge Luis Borges took up this theme in "The Library of Babel," where 
he observes that the library would contain not only its own true catalogue 
but also "thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the demonstration of 
the fallacy of those catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of the true 
catalogue." 
In short, just as a text can supply but not verify its true meaning, so too 
the universal library can supply but not verify its true catalogue. It is rela 
tively easy to understand the latter case; but the former instance is harder to 
see simply because we do not ordinarily realize (unless we are fresh from 
reading Montaigne) the extraordinary number of readings that can arise 
from the simplest of texts. When faced with such a text we are not usually 
distressed simply because we do not realize the range of possible readings 
lurking within it. We usually feel that somewhere (doubtless in our own 
heads) there exists a true and adequate commentary which fully explicates 
that text. But a full collection of all possible commentaries is one definition 
of the universal library, which is a plenum of all texts: and who will uncover 
its true commentary? 
Quite logically, Borges has pointed out the difficulty of ascribing mean 
ing to any book in the universal library, even the most sensible book. He 
demonstrates that if a single line can mean different things in the mouths of 
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different speakers (for example, Everything flow s as uttered by Heraclitus on 
the one hand and St. Jerome on the other), so much the more would an 
entire book mean utterly different things if, by some incredible chance, two 
different hands were to produce two identical volumes: 
If literature were nothing but verbal algebra, anyone could produce any 
book simply by practicing variations. The lapidary formula Everything 
flows abbreviates the philosophy of Heraclitus in two words. Raymond 
Lully would tell us that, after saying the first word, one needs only to 
substitute intransitive verbs in order to discover the second word and to 
obtain, by a methodical chance, that philosophy and many, many more. 
But we would reply that the formula obtained by elimination would lack 
value and even meaning. If it is to have any virtue we must conceive it as 
Heraclitus did, as an experience of Heraclitus. 
J.L. Borges, "For Bernard Shaw" 
In order to understand a line of Shakespeare, one must for the moment 
become Shakespeare. 
At the instant of his enlightenment during the sermon of the Buddha, 
what was the difference between the disciple Mahayaksepa and his teacher? 
Since the Buddha uttered no words at all in his Flower Sermon, and since 
Mahayaksepa understood him perfectly well, we can only conclude that the 
disciple already knew in some way what he desired to learn from the teach 
er. 
So too we often feel that what we learn from a text was something that 
we already knew. 
It follows then that in perfect communication nothing is transferred from a 
speaker to a listener: that is, in perfect communication, communication 
ceases to exist. 
But when a machine automatically utters something to another machine, 
which automatically absorbs it, we may consider that here too communica 
tion has not occurred. In this one respect, the two opposite cases are 
identical. Is there any analogy to this automatic utterance and automatic 
acceptance, in human discourse? There are of course instances of clich?-ex 
change in which no information is exchanged. But are there no instances in 
which mechanical exchange is not despised but is prized? 
We approach the text with the intention of grasping its spirit. We do so 
by means of our spirit: cor ad cor loquitur. But what if we are not to be trust 
ed? 
If the truth is universal and eternal, and if the inquirer is a mere indi 
vidual, then the teacher may feel that by tailoring his discourse to suit the 
personality of his listener, he may well be violating the truth. The teacher's 
strategy will then be to ignore the specifics of the question asked, and in 
sistently repeat the text. The implication is that the questioner is still en 
tangled with his personal demons, and ought to free himself of them by 
attending to the universally valid truth. 
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In this case what is prized is the letter, for the letter is the spirit. The oral 
recitation of the Upanishads has preserved for centuries not only the exact 
text but also the precise pronunciation and intonation of the ancient San 
skrit, so faithful has been the tradition. It is in this tradition of utter and 
automatic fidelity to the letter that we should understand the prayer-wheels 
of Tibet. Here, too, if we think the matter through to the end, we find 
the letter playing the part of the spirit, and the spirit assuming the guise of 
the letter. 
Total devotion to the letter has at least this merit, that it concentrates our 
energies on this statement and on no other. Even if the statement be only a 
part of the truth, such total devotion will energize the devotee in ways that a 
more sophisticated hovering has no power to do. 
Those of us who are only too aware not only of the text but also of the 
abundant commentary draped around it, have 
one recourse, several re 
courses. We will simply have to accept the fact that any text can give rise to 
at least two contradictory readings. Every discourse implies its own op 
posite, which it will end by dialectically affirming. 
Call one reading of a text R, and its opposite ~R; then every R im 
plies 
~ R: 
RC~R 
This kind of language will bring joy to no logical positivist. Note that the 
gap between these two opposites will be filled with intermediate positions, 
which can be arranged accordingly as they agree more strongly with R or 
with ~R: 
R, Ri, R2, R3 . . . Rn, ~R 
Such an array can stand for a set of volumes in the universal library, of 
which one asserts a certain thesis, the other asserts its opposite, and inter 
mediate books represent other more or less intermediate positions. 
The text may of course give birth to more than one set of opposite read 
ings; in which case we may lay out the second set at right angles to the first 
in the manner of a Cartesian graph: 
r 
ri 
(x) 
R,Ri,R2,R3,R4,Rs, ~R 
r3 
r4 
~r 
The point (x) would indicate that complex position composed of a simul 
taneous affirmation of Ri and r2. It is entirely possible that no one has yet 
come up with such an affirmation; but if the question under analysis is a 
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current one, the analyst may rest assured that some day history will fulfill 
his prediction and that some thinker, flushed and happy, will announce his 
discovery that Ri and n are both true. 
A third coordinate could be drawn at right angles to the other two. On 
the graphs thus created we represent the possible readings of a text. But 
whether we adopt a one-, two- or three-dimensional graph for a particular 
analysis, we will end not with a miscellaneous collection of opinion (got at 
random from the shelves of the universal library), but an organized^ze/d of 
opinion, arranged, like a magnetic field, between two polar opposites. Such 
a field, even if it does not yield a single unequivocal reading*, at least 
presents us with a comprehensible and even predictable form. 
Once a text is set down, no power on earth can prevent its being 
interpreted according to a wide range of meanings. The way in which a text 
works upon us is as puzzling as the way in which we mature. In the face of 
our incompetence to choose among the enormous range of meanings lurk 
ing in any text, how on earth can we find the right one? 
Consider the graph set out above. Should the proliferation of meanings 
dismay us? It is far from clear how a word sets to work; why can it not 
work in and through a wide semantic field? Everything utters itself in a 
single word, yet we use many words to describe it. Perhaps the hovering 
range of meanings is equivalent to the single word; perhaps each meaning in 
the array gets a chance to work in us as though the array composed one 
word, and that the right one. 
Perhaps the truth of the matter is that it is scarcely possible to avoid the 
proper meaning of a text. At times, when we read, we somewhat mis 
apprehend the precise point, and find instead what we very much need to 
know at that moment. On some of those occasions, the literal sense may 
have found us out. And, otherwise, if we seek the meaning of a word and 
find ourselves lost in its semantic field, perhaps the truth is that, happily, 
there is no place else to go. 
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